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INTRODUCTION BY PROFESSOR DOUGLAS W. KMIEC*
In this symposium celebrating a presidential inaugural,' we present the
scholarly work of some of the most exceptional constitutional scholars and
commentators of our time regarding a truly extraordinary term of the U.S.
Supreme Court. Present for the symposium were over 400 registrants, including
distinguished federal and state court judges, law professors from around the
nation, active constitutional litigators and students from numerous university law
schools. Many who came study with us or in nearby universities; others traveled
significant distances to join us. All found a magnificent university and campus
that in slightly more than six decades, has grown in stature to be-by the ubiquitous
measure of U.S. News-one of the top 50 universities in the United States.
Pepperdine now enrolls roughly 8,000 students under the instruction of more
than 300 professors and scholars. Many in the past have come to know us by our
rigorous great books program for undergraduates or because of our entrepreneurial
graduate business program. Some associate Pepperdine with the noble experi-
ment of moving the law from a wholly adversarial system to a healing one under
the expert tutelage of the men and women who staff our top-ranked dispute
resolution institute. Still others simply know us as that fortunate school in the
beautiful Santa Monica Mountains with a spectacular ocean view.
We obviously do not hide what historian and philosopher Will Durant once
referred to as "Pepperdine's magnificent situation." Virtually every Supreme
Court justice or distinguished scholar who has visited the law school has said
something similar. But we always admonish visitors to not let the natural beauty
of the university's campus mislead; what we are proudest of is the life of the mind
that is cultivated within this beauty. In Durant's words: "Oh to be young again
and listen to Plato and Christ in these halls perched on these hills, under these
skies!"
Well, under the skies of Pepperdine Law on September 23, 2000, we were
honored to have some of the finest legal minds and analysts ever assembled at any
university for any purpose. We are privileged now in this written record to share
their insights, and our own, into the work of the Supreme Court in our time.
Unlike the past several terms of relatively quiet and unexceptional statutory
interpretation, the Court in October Term 1999-2000 issued seventy-three
opinions, re-examining some of the most sensitive and contentious issues in the
land. Nineteen of those opinions were issued five-to-four, with alignments in
those particular decisions largely, but not always, fitting the popular conception
that the sitting Court is of moderate to conservative disposition.
However, the Court's characters did not always play their assumed roles. For
example, one of the most vocal opponents of Miranda,2 Chief Justice William
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Rehnquist, wrote to reaffirm those warnings as a constitutional requirement.3 As
USC's Professor Erwin Chemerinsky will illustrate, criminal defendants enjoyed
one of their best terms since the Warren era, prevailing in the bulk of cases
dealing with sentencing, the Fourth Amendment, as well as the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.4
The Court took up legislative power in two guises during the term under
review, and as my essay illustrates, an underlying consideration of both is political
accountability.5 Of course, federalism remains synonymous with the Rehnquist
Court, and the Justice's examination of the legislative commerce power reaffirms
that there is a limit to Congress' authority, even if the locus of the limitation
remains indeterminate. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the desire to disentangle
the national and local in its invalidation of a section of the Violence Against
Women Act.6 Separately, but also driven by concerns of constitutional account-
ability, was the Court's denial of regulatory authority to the FDA to regulate
tobacco.7 Legislative history of subsequent legislation turns out to mean a great
deal when the Court believes broadly worded agency power could not possibly
mean what it says and the product involved is one of major significance. Both
issues: the scope of the commerce power and deference to federal agencies have
already returned to the Court's attention, and there are some speculations on these
developments as well.
The modern progression of the judicial gloss upon the Eleventh Amendment
continued to augment immunity to private suit under federal statute-this time, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act.8 Professor Akhil Amar of Yale will
escort us down this fascinating journey.9 Along the way, he illustrates how long-
embedded Court doctrine has come to mean more than constitutional document.
Professor Amar describes the Court's decision in Kimel, for example, as "the
precise negation of the Founder's root idea that the People are sovereign and that
governments are not." "There is," he says, "no constitutional right for government
to violate the Constitution and get away with it."
Laurence Tribe, Harvard's Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, draws on
his knowledge of physics to explore unenumerated rights and their possible
underlying symmetries. ' In exploring the Boy Scout's ability to expel a
homosexual scout leader" and the Court's expulsion of school prayer from the
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Santa Fe football field, 2 among other cases, Professor Tribe attempts to illustrate
a distinction between being forced to support or include X as part of a neutral,
generally applicable obligation, and being forced to include X in order to change
your identity or message. He will argue that Boy Scouts is the first exception to
a neutral obligation. True to his remarkable ability to link even seemingly
disparate thoughts, Professor Tribe examines the Boy Scout result in light of the
reaffirmation of parental discretion in the grandparent/visitation dispute and
wonders whether the breadth of the parental claim to direct upbringing is in the
background of the Boy Scout decision. The partial birth case, 3 too, is taken up by
Professor Tribe, and he finds it illustrative of the proposition that the state cannot
commandeer (borrowing from the law of federalism) the manner in which a
woman decides to end her pregnancy. All of the cases preserve a sphere of private
choice, but Tribe wonders, at what cost to state authority to pursue vital social
ends?
Professor Michael McConnell outlines why a judicial rush to invalidate the
Santa Fe school district policy leaves the nation without a prayer-at least over the
loudspeaker at high school football games. "4 His explanation of this case and that
regarding the successful provision of aid to religious schools in Mitchell v. Helms 5
is knit together by the unifying theme of the state action doctrine. It will come as
no surprise that where there is state action, there can be no God, but what does and
does not count as state action is the continuation of a long debate over the nature
of the obligations imposed by the Establishment Clause.
Stanford Dean Kathleen Sullivan follows with a comprehensive look at all of
the term's First Amendment speech cases.'6 She reports that, unlike Professor
Chemerinsky's criminal defendants, the advocates of free speech generally lost last
term-maybe because they were all advocating unpopular things-unlimited
campaign contributions, 7 public nudity, 8 and abortion protest. 9 Only the Playboy
Channel won,2' which regrettably may tell us something about the denigrating
popularity of sexually explicit television. The dean admirably unravels the
campaign finance decision in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri, finding the Court stuck
12. Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
13. Stenberg v. Calhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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16. Kathleen Sullivan, Sex, Money, and Groups: Free Speech and Association Decisions in the
October 1999 Term, 28 PEa'. L. REV. 715 (2001).
17. Nixon v. Shrink Mo., 527 U.S. 1033 (1999).
18. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
19. Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
20. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
in dead center, neither having the votes to invalidate contribution limits from the
conservative side, nor from the liberal wing, the votes to impose limitations upon
spending. The dean is no doubt correct about the divisions on the Court, though
neither side seemed to like Buckley v. Valeo2 -the judicial origin of the contribu-
tion/expenditure distinction-much anymore, so the area remains ripe for change
of direction. In her review of the Colorado abortion protest limitation, Dean
Sullivan notes that Hill is "unusual in permitting a kind of listener preclearance
requirement in a public forum."
Jon Varat, dean at nearby U.C.L.A., finds a reaffirmation of existing law in
the dormant commerce area, but also undertakes a review of four preemption
cases, which gives lie to the notion that states uniformly win before the Rehnquist
Court.22 In each case, federal law trumped state provision, and in three of the four
cases, the federal government was aided and abetted by large business interests.
But Dean Varat says that doesn't tell the tale, since preemption inevitably involves
discerning congressional intent, and that says he, implicate a "multidimensional
process... involving aids to interpretation of legislative text," because that is so
often "inconclusive." Even though some of the decisions in this area last term
were unanimous, Dean Varat illustrates that this is no topic for a novice and he
very helpfully supplies a thoughtful list of factors that the Court employs in
preemption cases.
Each presentation is followed by a response, based upon an edited transcript
of the day, and those responses are followed with dialogue facilitated by Supreme
Court interlocutors of the first-rank: Nina Totenberg of National Public Radio; Jan
Crawford Greenburg of the Chicago Tribune and Jim Lehrer NewsHour; Marcia
Coyle of the National Law Journal, and David Pike of the Los Angeles and San
Francisco Daily Journals.
21. Buckley v. Valeo, 423 U.S. 820 (1975).
22. Jon Varat, Federalism and Preemption in October Term 1999, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 749 (2001).
